

### 4.3 The Man in the Middle

In this section we consider a communication protocol with asymmetric encryption, and note that the same attack works against the DIFFIE-HELLMAN key exchange. The basic problem is that an attacker can plant his own key into the procedure. In some more detail:

Suppose  $A = \text{Alice}$  and  $B = \text{Bob}$  want to exchange messages. First  $A$  sends her public key  $E_A$  to  $B$ , and  $B$  sends his public key  $E_B$  to  $A$ .

The attacker  $E = \text{Eve}$  who only listens cannot use these public data for eavesdropping. However the attacker  $M = \text{Mallory}$ , the “man in the middle” who actively forges messages, intercepts the key exchange, and each time replaces the intercepted public key by his own key  $E_M$ . From now on  $M$  is able to monitoring and even counterfeiting the complete communication of  $A$  and  $B$ . Figure 4.1 illustrates the attack.




Figure 4.1: The man in the middle

There are different ways to prevent this attack. But all of them make asymmetric encryption more complex. The usual way is the use of certificates: The public keys of all participants of a communication network get a digital signature by a “trusted third party”.

**Definition.** A certificate is a public key signed by a trusted third party.

**Mnemonic.** *A key exchange can be secure from the man in the middle only if the partners are mutually authenticated.*

**Exercise.** What information in the DIFFIE-HELLMAN protocol is suited to be used in a certificate?